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INTRODUCTION
Although much has been written about the current energy crisis, most
reports have focused on the national and international situations. The purpose
here is to examine the fuels and energy situation in the Midwest Region, with
special emphasis on the industrial sector. The "Midwest Region" is defined as
the nine-state area that includes Illinois and surrounding states, as shown in
figure 1. Coke usage by the iron and steel industry is not covered in this
paper, and developments in the electric utility industry are discussed only in
so far as they affect the fuels and energy situation in the Midwest industrial
market
.
TRENDS IN ENERGY CONSUMPTION
The United States
The industrial sector of the economy has traditionally been the
largest single consumer of direct energy in the United States, using 28.8 per-
cent of the total energy in 1972. In terms of the current energy crisis, the
period since 1967 is the most important, because it was during this time that
two previously unrelated trends converged to compound the problems of increas-
ing shortages of fuels. First, the domestic reserves of oil and natural gas
* Adapted from a paper presented at the Industrial Fuel Conference, Purdue University,
West Lafayette, Indiana, October 4- , 1973.
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Fig. 1 - Boundaries of Midwest Region.
"began to be depleted at a rate faster
than new discoveries were being made.
Second, the imposition of new envi-
ronmental protection laws placed re-
strictions on the amount of sulfur
oxides that might be emitted from
stationary sources. As most of the
currently available coals and many of
the oils contain significant amounts
of sulfur , and as there has been no
way available to remove the resultant
sulfur oxides from the flue gases
,
there was a rush to convert to
"clean" fuels such as natural gas and
low-sulfur fuel oil. The already de-
veloping fuels shortages were conse-
quently intensified.
Between 1967 and 1972, the total
consumption of energy in the United
States increased 23.7 percent, from
58.3 quadrillion Btu to 72.1 quadril-
lion Btu. During this period, house-
hold and commercial consumption rose by 13.0 percent, electric utilities consump-
tion by U5.U percent, transportation sector consumption by 27.5 percent, and
industrial sector consumption by lU.5 percent. As a result, industry's share
of total direct energy consumption declined from 31.1 percent in 1967 to 28.8
percent in 1972. On the other hand, direct consumption of energy in the elec-
tric utilities sector increased from 21.8 percent in 1967 to 25.6 percent of
the total gross energy in 1972 (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973b, p. 23; U.S. Bur. Mines,
1973c, p. k).
Electricity is, of course, ultimately consumed by other sectors of
the economy in the production of goods and services. Between 1967 and 1972,
purchases of electricity by the transportation sector increased by 5.9 percent,
those by the household and commercial sector by 52.8 percent, and those by the
industrial sector by 32.0 percent. Despite this shift by the industrial sec-
tor toward greater use of indirect energy in the form of electricity, the over-
all growth in industrial use of total energy was only 16.1 percent—lower than
the 18.9 percent increase in the household and commercial sector and the 27.^+
percent increase in the transportation sector (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973b, p. 23;
U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973c, p. U). Part of this slower increase in the growth of
total energy use by industry probably reflects industry's more efficient use
of energy and its greater sensitivity to price changes.
The Midwest Region
Trends in energy use (on a heat content basis) in the industrial
sector of the Midwest Region are illustrated in figure 2. Although the total
use of energy in the Midwest industrial market increased by 38 percent between
i960 and 1971, the use of coal declined by 22 percent and the use of residual
oils declined by 52 percent. These declines were offset by increases in the
use of natural gas (up 127 percent), distillate fuel oils (up 37 percent), and
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*Residuol fuel oil, distillate fuel oil, and LPG.
Fig. 2 - Industrial Use of energy in
the Midwest Region, 196O-I97I, by
source. (Source: U.S. Bureau of
Mines, Minerals Yearbooks, I96O-
1971.)
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Pig. 3 - Industrial use of various fuels
as a percentage of the total consump-
tion of that fuel by all sectors in the
United States, 196O-1971. (Compiled
from U.S. Bureau of Mines and American
Petroleum Institute data. )
liquefied petroleum gases (up Ul per-
cent). Although the share of total
energy supplied by all fossil fuels
has remained relatively constant at
about two-thirds, the relative shares
supplied by individual fuels have
changed considerably. Coal's share
declined from 51 percent in i960 to
only 31 percent in 1971, while the
contribution of natural gas increased
from 36 percent to 63 percent in the
same period. While distillate fuel
oil and LPG merely held their own,
residual fuel oil's share declined
from 9.^ percent to 3.*+ percent.
Industrial use of various fossil
fuels as a percentage of the total
U.S. consumption of that fuel from
i960 through 1971 is indicated in
figure 3. Natural gas is the only
fuel for which the industrial sector
increased its share of the total mar-
ket
,
from 28 percent in i960 to 36
percent in 1971. Industrial use of
coal and residual fuel oils declined
sharply, while industrial use of dis-
tillates remained essentially un-
changed.
Figure h indicates the percent-
age of the total industrial use of
various fossil fuels consumed by in-
dustry in the Midwest Region from
I960 through 1971. Only coal showed
an increase, and that increase merely
reflects the fact that industrial use
of coal has been phased out faster in
non-Midwest areas than in the Mid-
west. Therefore, although the total
coal market declined, the larger
share of the remaining market lies in
the Midwest Region.
Coal
Figure 5 indicates the trends in
the industrial use of coal by states
of the Midwest Region for 1960-1972.
The use of coal by industry is con-
centrated mainly in Illinois , Indi-
ana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin,
the western end of the so-called
"manufacturing belt." Industrial use
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Fig. 4 - Fuel consumption by industry in
the Midwest Region as a percentage of
the total U.S. consumption of that fuel
by all industry, 196O-1971. Curves for
Nos. 5 and 6 residual heating oils also
reflect large commercial use. (Compiled
from U.S. Bureau of Mines and American
Petroleum Institute data.)
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Fig. 5 - Cumulative coal consumption by
industry in the Midwest Region, 196O-
1972, by state (Source: U. S. Bureau
of Mines Bituminous Coal and Lignite
Distribution reports.)
of coal in these states showed steady-
growth from 1961 through 1966, fol-
lowed by a sharp decline through
1971. For the Midwest Region as a
whole, industrial use of coal in-
creased by 13 percent from i960
through 1966; from 1966 through 1972,
consumption declined 28 percent.
These over-all averages conceal
widely varying rates of change in the
individual states. From i960 to 1966,
all the states of the region except
Minnesota and Missouri increased
their consumption; since 1966 all
states in the region have shown a de-
cline in industrial coal use, ranging
from a high of 52 percent in Illinois
to a low of 8 percent in Indiana. In
terms of tonnage, industrial coal
consumption in the Midwest Region has
declined from a recent peak of 54.4
million tons in 1966 to 39.2 million
tons in 1972.
Ironically, the Midwest Region
is blessed with an abundance of coal
resources. In recent years the re-
gion's mines have accounted for 40 to
45 percent of the total coal produc-
tion in the United States, and pro-
duction increased from 166.3 million
tons in i960 to 269. million tons in
1972. Most of the growth resulted
from the increased demand for coal by
the electric utility industry. Al-
though the region is both an exporter
and importer of coal, it is essen-
tially self-sufficient in coal. Be-
tween i960 and 1968, it was a net im-
porter, although imports declined
from 21.7 million tons in i960 to 2.0
million tons in 1968. In 1969, the
region became a net exporter of coal
and has remained so since then. Fig-
ure 6 indicates these trends in the
coal position in the Midwest Region
between i960 and 1972.
whereas, traditionally, the re-
gion has received most of its coal
imports from the Appalachian areas of
West Virginia, Virginia, and Tennes-
see (District 8), in recent years
there has been a substantial increase
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Fig. 6 - Trends in coal production and in to-
tal and industrial consumption in Midwest
Region. (Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines Min-
erals Yearbooks and Coal Distribution Re-
ports. )
in imports of coal from the West, es-
pecially from Montana and Wyoming.
Between 1967 and 1972, imports of
western coal (Districts 16-23) in-
creased by 15-fold from 875,000 tons
to 12.7 million tons. Despite this
large increase, western coal still
accounted for only k.Q percent of the
region's 1972 coal consumption, and
essentially all of it was used by
electric utilities.
Natural Gas
Figure 7 shows the trends in
natural gas consumption by industry
in the Midwest Region between i960
and 1972. During that period the use
of gas increased substantially, main-
ly at the expense of coal, because of
the superior handling and burning
qualities and low price of gas. Since
1970, compliance with air pollution regulations has accelerated the demand for
clean-burning gas , although recent shortages have almost stopped any further
increases in gas consumption by industry.
While industrial use of gas in the Midwest Region grew at an aver-
age rate of 10.8 percent per year between i960 and 1966, the national growth
in industrial gas usage was only 9.2 percent per year. Between 1966 and 1971,
gas consumption by industry in the Midwest increased at a slower average rate
than the national rate for the industry
—
7.6 percent versus 9.6 percent per
year. However, during both periods, the industrial consumption of gas in the
Midwest Region increased faster than 2
the total consumption
region.
of gas in the
In 1972, because of a national
gas shortage, total gas consumption
in the United States increased by
only 1.2 percent—a much lower annual
rate than had prevailed during the
preceding decade. Consumption by
"electric utilities" and "other con-
sumers" declined by 0.U percent and
k.h percent, respectively. Industrial
use of gas in 1972 was essentially
unchanged from 1971 (up . U percent);
only residential and commercial use
of gas showed substantial increases.
Figure 8 shows the trends in the
production and consumption of natural
gas in the Midwest Region between
E 08
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Fig. 7 - Cumulative natural gas consumption
by industry in the Midwest Region, 196O-
1972, by state. (Source: U.S. Bureau of
Mines Minerals Yearbooks, 196O-1971, and
Natural Gas Annual, 1973.)
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I960 and 1972. Although there was a
steady growth in total gas consump-
tion in the Midwest through 1971, the
amount of gas produced (the marketed
production) from states within the
region remained at a low level—lUU
to 189 billion cubic feet per year.
As this represents less than 5 per-
cent of the region's total annual de-
mand, imports from states outside the
region and from Canada supply most of
the natural gas consumed.
The impact of the gas shortage
was also felt in the Midwest for the
first time in 1972. Although over-all
consumption increased slightly (0.8
percent), consumption of gas by elec-
tric utilities declined 22.5 percent,
and the use of gas by industry and
"other consumers" was essentially un-
changed from 1971. Only the commer-
cial and residential sectors showed
significant increases in consumption.
On a state basis, total gas consump-
tion in 1972 declined 1.8 percent in
Illinois, 0.9 percent in Missouri, 7.8 percent in Wisconsin, 0.03 percent in
Iowa, and 0.01 percent in Minnesota. During 1972, industrial gas consumption
declined in five of the nine states of the Midwest Region—Illinois (-2.0 per-
cent), Michigan (-0.3 percent), Wisconsin (-11. h percent), Minnesota (-0.8
percent), and Missouri (-8.U percent).
Industrial use
Marketed production\
I960 1966 1968 1970 1972
Fig. 8 - Marketed production and industrial
and total consumption of natural gas in
Midwest Region, 1960-1972. (U.S. Bureau
of Mines Minerals Yearbooks, 196O-1971,
and Natural Gas Annual, 1973.)
Refined Oil Products
Refined petroleum products contributed only a small and declining
share of the fossil fuel needs of industry in the Midwest Region during the
decade of the 1960s, falling from 12.5 percent in i960 to 6.3 percent in 1970.
Use of distillate oils generally ranged between 10 and 12 million barrels per
year. However, beginning in 1971 there was a sudden upsurge in consumption
as other "clean" fuels became scarce in relation to the increased demand. Con-
sumption of distillate oils increased by 2^.6 percent in 1971 and by lU.l per-
cent in 1972, reaching 15-5 million barrels in the latter year. Major in-
creases were reported in Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky.
Use of residual fuel oil by industry in the Midwest Region declined
between i960 and 1971, falling from 35.8 million barrels to 17.1 million bar-
rels. Part of this decline was probably attributable to the increasing com-
petition for residual oil by electric utilities, the high sulfur content of
the available oils , and the fact that combustion of residual oils requires pre-
heating and special handling techniques. The downward trend in industrial use
was reversed in 1972 as consumption increased by 11.1 percent. The upsurge
probably resulted from increased demand from customers who found themselves
short of gas and in need of additional fuels.
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Although the Midwest Region has "been a producer of crude petroleum
for over 100 years, current production is low and declining. Between i960
and 1972, the region's over-all production fell by U5 percent, from 131.9 mil-
lion barrels to 72.0 million barrels. The estimated demand* for oil products
in the Midwest Region in i960 was about 875 million barrels, but by 1972 it
had increased by 60 percent to an estimated l.H billion barrels. Because
local production was decreasing, dependence on oils imported from outside the
region increased from 85 percent in i960 to 95 percent in 1972. However, be-
cause United States crude oil production has essentially peaked, future addi-
tions to supply will increasingly have to he imported from foreign sources.
For statistical purposes, the U.S. Bureau of Mines has divided
the country into five Petroleum Administration for Defense (PAD) Districts.
PAD District II includes the Midwest Region and North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Prior to 1972, all foreign crude
oil imports into PAD II came from Canada. However, since 1972 the demand has
increased so rapidly that imports from Canada have not been sufficient, and
oil from more distant sources has been imported into the Midwest. While crude
oil imports from Canada during the first six months of 1973 surpassed by 1+8.2
percent the imports for the same months in 1972 (79»582,000 bbl versus
117,907,000 bbl), imports from other overseas areas increased by 782 percent,
from 1.72 million barrels to 15.17 million barrels. The Arab countries of
North Africa and the Middle East accounted for 62 percent of these non-Cana-
dian imports (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973e). As a result, the Midwest Region was
rapidly becoming directly dependent on Arab oil, and no diminishing of this
trend was indicated until the recent oil embargo on the part of the Arab oil-
producing countries. Only time will tell how serious the shortages created
by the recently imposed embargo really will be.
Electricity
Energy may be used either directly or indirectly. In the past,
direct use of energy in the form of fossil fuels dominated industrial use,
but it now appears that the trend in industry is to use more electricity than
it has done in the past. Consumption of electric energy by industry in the
Midwest Region increased from 112 billion kilowatt-hours in i960 to 176 bil-
lion kilowatt-hours in 1971, an increase of 56. h percent. This growth rate
was faster than that for fossil fuels as a whole (+30.9 percent ), with the re-
sult that electricity's share of the total energy consumed by industry in-
creased from 33.6 percent in i960 to 37.1 percent in 1971 (Federal Power Comm.,
1960-1971).
PRICE TRENDS
In the past, energy has been one of the greatest bargains available.
Industrial consumers have been even more fortunate than other consumers , for
most of them were large-volume users and thus qualified for discount rates.
For natural gas consumers there were "interruptible" rates, which, combined
* Estimated demand equals gasoline sales + distillate oil sales + residual oil sales + LPG and
ethane sales + 15 percent to allow for wax, lubricants, etc., which are not reported on a
state basis.
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with Federal Power Commission regula-
tion of wellhead prices , made natural
gas very cheap despite its being a
premium fuel.
Figure 9 shows the trends in the
average cost of coal, oil, and natu-
ral gas at the point of production
(i.e., at the mine or wellhead) from
i960 through 1972 in the United
States. The price is given in cents
per million Btu so that direct com-
parison on an equivalent heat-value
basis is possible. Clearly, natural
gas has been the cheapest of the
three major fuels, followed closely
by coal. Oil is decidedly a more ex-
pensive source of energy, competitive
on the basis of its ability to supply
energy for special uses (such as
transportation) more efficiently and/
or more conveniently than coal or
natural gas. It is significant that,
while the current energy crisis has
been reflected in increased prices
for both oil and coal since 1968, the
Crude oil at the wellhead .
Coal f.o.b. mine
'0- Natural gas-at the wellhead
1
1962
—
I
19641960
Fig. 9 - Average U.S
of production for
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1966 1968 1970 1972
fuel price at the point
each major fuel, 196O-
1972. (Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines Miner-
als Yearbooks, 196O-197I; Minerals Industry-
Survey, 1972; pers. comms. from L. W. Wes-
terstrom and Jacob Van Den Berg.)
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Fig. 10 - Average delivered price for var-
ious fuels, 196O-1971.
(a) Average price for No. 2 dis-
tillate oil delivered at New
York harbor (U.S. Bureau of
Mines Minerals Yearbooks,
196O-I971).
(b) Average price of natural gas
at point of consumption, all
uses (U.S. Bureau of Mines
Minerals Yearbooks, I96O-
1971).
(c) Average price for No. 5 re-
sidual oil delivered at New
York harbor (U.S. Bureau of
Mines Minerals Yearbooks,
I96O-1971).
(d) Average delivered price for
utility coal (National Coal
Association, Steam-Electric
Plant Factors , annual issues).
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increase in gas prices has "been almost negligible—reflecting the "hold down"
effects of the Federal Power Commission regulations. Even within the confines
of the present price controls, however, the Federal Power Commission has al-
lowed substantial increases in the prices for new gas from certain fields (Wall
Street Jour., 1973b).
However, the cost of fuels at the point of production is not really
the crucial factor. More important is the relative cost of these fuels deliv-
ered at the market. Figure 10 indicates the trends in delivered prices for
various fossil fuels. On a delivered basis, coal has a decided price advantage
compared with oil and gas, even despite the sharp increases in recent years.
Coal for the industrial market probably will have a higher delivered price
than the average price for coal delivered to the utility market. The average
small industrial consumer often is not in a position to take advantage of the
discounts offered by unit trains and long-term, large-tonnage contracts. How-
ever, even allowing for additional transportation charges and other expenses,
coal still should be competitive with other fuels in the Midwest industrial
market on a strictly price basis.
As can be seen from figure 11, the average price, f.o.b. the mine,
for coals mined in the Midwest Region has consistently been less than the av-
erage for all bituminous coal and lignite mined in the United States. Because
of their relatively high Btu content and favorable location with regard to
market, coals of the Midwest Region can absorb considerable transportation and
handling charges and still remain competitive with refined petroleum products
and natural gas.
Range for Midwest coo) producers
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968
•Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, Iowa, and Missouri.
1970 1972
Fig. 11 - Average U.S. coal price, f.o.b.
mine, compared with range of average
price for coal produced in Midwest Re-
gion, 196O-I972. (Source: U.S. Bureau
of Mines Minerals Yearbooks, 196O-I97I;
Minerals Industry Survey, 1972; pers
.
comms. from L. W. Westerstrom and Jacob
Van Den Berg.
)
The average 1972 price for coals
produced in the Midwest Region (fig.
ll) ranged from a low of $U.86 per
ton in Iowa to a high of $6.8l per
ton in Kentucky. If we assume that
the maximum transport costs for mov-
ing such coals to markets within the
Midwest Region is $2.00 per ton, then
the upper limit on delivered costs
should be around $8.80 per ton. If
the coal has a heat value of between
10,000 and 11,000 Btu per pound, the
maximum delivered cost for Midwest
coals should be around Uo to hk cents
per million Btu. This would be a max-
imum upper limit ; many "local" coals
are delivered for considerably less.
Since the average 1972 price for nat-
ural gas delivered to industrial con-
sumers in the Midwest Region was 59.1
cents per million Btu and the deliv-
ered prices for refined petroleum
products were even higher, it is ob-
vious that midwestern coals are
priced competitively.
Western coals in comparison with
other fuels delivered to the Midwest
- 10 -
industrial market do not compete so favorably. The average values, f.o.b.
the mine , for coals produced in Wyoming and Montana—the leading suppliers
of western coal to midwestern consumers—were $3.7*+ and $2.03 per ton, re-
spectively, in 1972 (personal communication from L. W. Westerstrom, Fossil
Fuels Dvn. , U.S. Bur. Mines, Oct. 30, 1973). However, although the mine
prices are lower than midwestern coal prices , the combination of longer ship-
ping distances—up to four times as long as midwestern local hauls—and a
heat content 10 to 20 percent lower than that of midwestern coals makes the
cost of western coals delivered to Illinois and Indiana almost double that
for local coals. According to the Federal Power Commission, electric util-
ities in Illinois and Indiana during December, 1972, paid 62.76 and 59.83
cents per million Btu, respectively, for low-sulfur western coals. The
prices for the higher sulfur local coals ranged from 31.38 to 36.33 cents
per million Btu, delivered to the same utilities. The differential in Iowa,
Minnesota, and Missouri was much less (Federal Power Comm. , 1973).
Despite recent price increases, natural gas. is still competitively
priced, but projected curtailments make it unlikely that gas will be avail-
able to meet all current and projected demands for it. The alternative is
oil, but the prices for most oil products are currently higher on a cents-p.er-
million Btu basis than even western coals and are expected to rise higher as
the fuels shortage intensifies.
Whereas price was a key factor in determining the fuel used by in-
dustry in the past, price in the future will be secondary to other considera-
tions, such as fuels availability and environmental considerations. These
latter two considerations are inter-related to varying degrees.
AVAILABILITY OF FUELS IN THE UNITED STATES
The fuels situation in the United States can be summed up in three
brief statements. First, most of the coal currently being mined has a sulfur
content too high to meet proposed air quality standards, and no technology is
currently available to remove this sulfur economically from the coal itself
or from the gases produced during combustion. Second, domestic reserves of
oil and natural gas are inadequate to sustain sufficient production to meet
all of the rapidly increasing demand for these fuels, including the demands
for "clean" fuels being made by former coal users. Third, imports of crude
oil and refined petroleum products offer the only short-term option for al-
leviating our energy crisis because "new" sources of energy such as liquefied
natural gas (LNG) , synthetic natural gas (SNG) made from petroleum feedstocks
and/or coal, solar energy, and geothermal power will not be ready to make any
significant contribution to the over-all energy supply for at least a decade.
Coal
Coal and lignite are the most abundant fossil fuels, accounting for
about 90 percent of the world's known recoverable energy (Hubbert, 1971,
p. 66). Current estimates of the known reserves ("identified resources") of coal
remaining in the ground in the United States amount to some 1.59 trillion tons,
of which 390 billion tons is considered to be recoverable with current tech-
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nology (Theobald, Schweinfurth , and Duncan, 1972, p. 3). Unfortunately, the
continued and expanded use of this resource is being threatened by new air
pollution regulations.
Practically all fossil fuels naturally contain sulfur in various
amounts. During combustion, most of this sulfur is converted into sulfur ox-
ides, which are discharged out the stack with other combustion gases. If the
ground-level concentrations of these oxides exceed a certain level, plants,
animals, and human beings subjected to prolonged exposure to the oxides can
be adversely affected. Because no stack-gas cleaning device has yet proved
effective, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency, as a means of reduc-
ing the sulfur oxides level in the ambient air to a desired lower level, has
set maximum levels of sulfur content for fuels burned by stationary sources.
The Federal and Illinois regulations (Illinois EPA, 1973) currently set a max-
imum limit for all new solid-fuel-fired units of 1.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide
emissions per million Btu of heat input. This amount is equivalent to only
0.6 percent sulfur in a coal with a heat content of 10,000 Btu per pound. Any
unit that has been significantly modified since the law became effective is
classified as a new source. The standards for existing plants are also being
made more restrictive. After May 30, 1975, old plants located in the Chicago,
St. Louis, and Peoria metropolitan areas of Illinois may not emit more than
1.8 pounds of sulfur dioxide per million Btu of heat input. This is equiva-
lent to only 0.9 - 1.1 percent sulfur in typical midwestern coals (assuming
10,000 to 12,000 Btu/pound). Old units located outside of the above-mentioned
metropolitan areas may not emit more than 6.0 pounds of sulfur oxides per mil-
lion Btu of heat input after May 30, 1975. For a coal with a heat value of
10,000 Btu per pound, the 6-pound limit would be equivalent to 3 percent sulfur
in a coal.
The problems in meeting these standards are that very few of the
coals currently being mined contain such a low percentage of sulfur. Essen-
tially all of the coals occurring in the states lying east of the Mississippi
River, where 90 percent of the current production occurs (U.S. Bur. Mines,
1973b, p. 330-33^), are of the bituminous variety, and, unfortunately, only
8 percent of them contain 0.7 percent or less sulfur. Moreover, 97 percent
of the coals that are very low in sulfur are located in eastern Kentucky, West
Virginia, and Virginia (Federal Power Comm. , 1971, p. 1-^-9). Because of
their favorable combination of low ash, low sulfur, and strong coking charac-
teristics, these coals are particularly suited for coking and for use in blends
for the manufacture of coke. As a result, many of the best reserves of these
coking coals are tied up by steel companies for their own (captive) use.
Others are reserved by the mining companies for sale under long-term contract
to steel companies in both the U.S. and overseas. These are premium coals
and traditionally have commanded higher than average prices. Although these
low-sulfur coals could be a possible source of "clean" fuel for industrial
consumers in the Midwest who seek to replace their high-sulfur coals , there
is little surplus mine capacity in the low-sulfur area to supply them, and
the cost of using these premium coals may be prohibitive.
Even the more lenient standards for existing plants in nonmetropol-
itan areas would eliminate a large part of the coal currently being mined in
the Midwest Region. If 3.0 percent is assumed to be the maximum sulfur allow-
able, 8l percent of the coal reserves in Illinois would be disqualified, as
would 5^ percent of Indiana's coal, 85 percent of the coal in western Kentucky,
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69 percent of the coal in Ohio, and all of the coal in the states of Michigan,
Iowa, and Missouri. On a national basis, U3 percent of all bituminous coals
have sulfur contents in excess of 3.0 percent (DeCarlo, Sheridan, and Murphy,
1966, p. 19).
While approximately 70 percent of the coal reserves of the United
States lies in states west of the Mississippi River (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973b,
p. 330), western coals thus far have been developed only marginally because
they were far from the major markets and generally lower in grade than the
more favorably located eastern and midwestern coals. However, in the light
of the current energy shortage and the critical need for low-sulfur fuels,
many producers and consumers have begun to re-evaluate these western resources
,
and a number of large new mines have already been developed in the West.
Estimates show that in states west of the Mississippi River 26
percent of the bituminous coals, 66 percent of the subbituminous coals, and
77 percent of the lignites contain 0.7 percent sulfur or less (Federal Power
Comm. , 1971, p. I-U-9). Although these low-sulfur coal resources seem a
promising source of energy, several problems are associated with their use
and with any attempt at rapid large-scale switching from currently available
high-sulfur fuels to low-sulfur western coals.
First, the heat contents of the lignites are so low that they must
be burned at or very near the mine because transport costs per million Btu of
heat energy is prohibitive. Even the abundant higher Btu subbituminous coals
may have heat contents as low as 8300 Btu per pound. Although most western
coals have a low sulfur content , they also have low heat values that may still
make it impossible for them to meet a 1.2 pound sulfur oxides limit. It is
difficult to determine just how much of these coals would be eliminated from
use without flue-gas desulfurization facilities. Risser (1973, p. *+l) has
indicated that a preliminary examination of available data from the North Cen-
tral Power Study reveals a substantial portion of the coals reported on could
not meet the standard.
Second, the ash fusion characteristics of many of the western coals
are quite different from those of the coals now being used by Midwest consum-
ers. These differences can cause clogging and ash discharging problems in the
boilers (Wall Street Jour., 1970).
Third, the distance from the western coal fields to the Midwest in-
dustrial markets is 700 to 1000 miles. As a result, transportation costs can
double or triple the cost of the coal f.o.b. the mine. The cost of western
coals delivered to the Chicago area is reportedly twice as much as the deliv-
ered cost of the local (Illinois), higher sulfur coals formerly used (Rifakes,
1971, p. 13).
Fourth, there is at present no surplus mine capacity in the western
coal fields. Any customer wishing to use western coals must first make a con-
tract with a mining company to develop a new mine or expand capacity at an ex-
isting mine. The time required between initial commitment and first deliveries
is likely to run from a minimum of 1 year for expansion of an old mine to as
much as 2 or 3 years for development of a new mine.
Last, there is the question of environmental regulations. Most of
the projected output of western coal is scheduled to be strip mined, both be-
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cause of cheaper production costs and because many of the coals lie too close
to the surface for underground mining to be feasible or safe. Consequently,
questions arise about strip mine reclamation and potential air and water pol-
lution from such mining operations. Environmentalists argue that proper rec-
lamation of much of the strip mined land in the more arid areas would be ex-
tremely difficult. The conclusions of a study by a special panel of the
National Academy of Sciences would seem to agree with this assessment (Gillette,
1973). If new laws banning or severely curtailing strip mining are passed
(Science, 1973), large quantities of low-sulfur coal from the West will be es-
sentially unavailable. Air pollution is not normally a major problem for strip
coal mines located in humid climates because there is adequate water to keep
dust under control; however, in the arid areas of the West such a problem can
be severe. A new mine near Rock Springs, Wyoming, was reportedly abandoned
last year by its developers when it became apparent that there was no economic
way to solve the problems of dust created in the loading and storing of coal
at the mine (Wall Street Jour., 1972b).
Another approach to solving the sulfur problem is to continue to
burn high-sulfur coals but clean the sulfur oxides from the combustion gases
before discharging them into the outside air. Several different approaches
to the problem have been tried, both here and overseas. Many of the proposed
systems have been designed primarily with the electric utility market in mind,
and their economics and technical characteristics may limit or prohibit their
use on small industrial units. Although a number of systems are currently be-
ing installed in industrial plants in this country for testing purposes, only
a few have been operated in a plant long enough for 'their success to be ade-
quately judged.
One notable success has been the "Double Alkali" system, developed
by the General Motors Corporation. In this system, a solution of caustic soda
is used to remove the sulfur from the flue gases. The system was installed at
their plant in St. Louis, Missouri, in the fall of 1972 and has operated suc-
cessfully for more than a year, achieving 90 percent removal of the sulfur di-
oxide (SO2). However, the system as used in St. Louis had one drawback. The
waste sulfite liquor in the scrubber effluent was being disposed of by dis-
charging it, with approval of local authorities, into the city sewer system.
Since such an option is not likely to be widely available elsewhere, General
Motors has since modified the system to eliminate the potential water pollution
problem by treating the sulfite liquor with lime. The lime causes the sulfur
to precipitate as a solid, and a clear caustic soda solution results. This
solution can then be re-cycled in the system. The precipitates can be collected
as a solid waste cake and disposed of in a landfill (General Motors Corp.
,
1973).
Several other systems, such as the "Bahco" and the "Citrate" proces-
ses, are currently being installed on industrial-sized units at various places
in the country, and the developers are optimistic about their chances for suc-
cess. Even if these and other systems prove successful, it will take several
years to equip all plants that are currently burning high-sulfur fuels.
Natural Gas
Natural gas is an ideal fuel; it burns cleanly, is easy to handle and
transport, and is cheap. In a normal market situation, it would be considered
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a premium fuel and would carry a premium price. However, the wellhead prices
of natural gas have been controlled by the Federal Power Commission since 195^,
under the assumption that reserves were more than ample and that the public's
interest would be best served by keeping the prices low. The artificially low
price of gas acted to keep a lid on coal and oil prices as well, since there
is much inter-fuel competition in most sectors of the economy, especially the
industrial. This distortion of the market caused many customers to switch to
gas when another more abundant fuel, such as coal, would have sufficed to meet
their needs.
The effects of regulated low prices for gas were two-fold. First, it
stimulated the rate of consumption of natural gas, and, second, it decreased
the incentive to drill for new gas reserves. Drilling activity declined sharply,
and new additions to reserves fell. Although some observers (Risser, i960
,
p. 13; Carrico, 1963 ) warned that such a policy would lead to gas shortages
in the 1970s, the country continued to consume gas as though supplies were un-
limited. Only in 1967 , when gas consumption actually exceeded new gas discov-
eries and caused total reserves to decline, did some people begin to take the
situation seriously. Each year since then, with the exception of 1970, more
gas has been consumed than has been found. The huge reserves of gas in the
Prudhoe Bay area on the North Slope of Alaska, which were first discovered in
1968, were evaluated and added to the total reserves in 1970, causing a sig-
nificant upsurge in reserves for that year. The following two years have
shown a continuation of the downward trend in discoveries and in total reserves.
The current shortages in natural gas probably would have shown up
earlier except for the fact that the United States has been able to import in-
creasing amounts of gas. To date, these imports have been mostly by pipeline
from Canada and, to a much lesser degree, from Mexico (Federal Power Comm.
1972, p. 39-^1). Despite a rapid rate of growth in recent years, only in 1972
did imports actually exceed 1 trillion cubic feet (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973c, p.
6). Although these imports are quite necessary to certain parts of the coun-
try, their total contribution is still less than 5 percent of the United States
total gas needs. Because of increasing demands in Canada and a slowing in the
finding rate of new Canadian discoveries , a leveling off or even a decline in
natural gas imports from Canada is likely, unless gas from Arctic regions be-
comes available soon (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973c).
Petroleum and Petroleum Products
The United States is the world's largest producer of petroleum, cur-
rently accounting for some 20 percent of the total. In 1971 the United States
produced 3.^5 billion barrels, whereas the Soviet Union, the second largest
producer, produced 2.78 billion barrels. The gap, however, is closing quickly
(U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973b, p. 855, 969). It has been predicted that by late 197^
the Soviets will take the lead in world oil production (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973d,
p. 73).
Unfortunately, despite our huge domestic production, the United States
must import sizable amounts of crude petroleum and refined products. In fact,
the United States has been a net importer since 19^8. U.S. dependence* on for-
eign oils has grown from 8.1 percent in 1950 to l6.5 percent in i960 to 28.3
Net imports as a percentage of total new supply.
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percent in 1972 (Am. Petroleum Inst.,
1971, p. 28U; 1973, p. 1). It has
been projected that, under the most
unfavorable assumptions, the United
States might be importing as much as
66 percent of its total oil needs by
1980 (Nat. Petroleum Council, 1972,
p. 17, 24).
Oil has many advantages over gas
and coal. It can be moved by barge,
pipeline, ocean tanker, or truck. It
is a liquid at room temperature, and,
therefore, unlike liquefied natural
gas, requires no special containers.
Oil is an essential fuel because it
can be used in its various refined
forms as a source of energy in more
different sectors and markets than
either of the other fossil fuels. Not
only is it important in the utili-
ties, household, commercial, and in-
dustrial sectors , it is the dominant
fuel in the transportation sector. In
essence, oil "moves" the country.
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Pig. 12 - Trends in U.S. oil supply and de-
mand, 1946-1972. (Source: American Pet-
roleum Institute.)
Figure 12 shows the United States
production, consumption, reserves,
and imports of petroleum and petro-
leum products from 1946 through 1972.
While reserves increased at a modest
rate between 1946 and 1958, there was no significant change during the next 11
years. In 1970 a significant jump in their level was accounted for by the ad-
dition of the reserves at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Since 1946, production has in-
creased steadily, but not fast enough to keep pace with domestic demand. The
deficit was filled by imports, which grew at a very rapid rate; imports of re-
fined products increased even more rapidly than imports of crude petroleum.
Because domestic production has exceeded new additions to reserves
(excluding Alaska) for every year since 1967, total proved reserves in the
United States are beginning to decline. The average maximum sustainable pro-
ductive level for all oil fields is about one-eighth of the amount of the to-
tal reserves. Therefore, when the ratio of reserves to production reaches 8
to 1, an increase in production can occur only when reserves are increased.
If reserves decline and the R/P ratio approaches 8 to 1, production must
level off or even decline. An indication of the seriousness of the U.S.
oil production situation is the 1972 R/P ratio for oil (excluding Alaska),
which fell to 8.17 to 1.
Domestic production of crude oil peaked in 1970 with an output of
3.32 billion barrels (Am. Gas Assoc, et al., 1973, p. 24) . Although 1972 pro-
duction was slightly more than the 1971 total , it did not equal the record
set in 1970. Only eight states actually showed any gain in output over 1971,
and that was more than offset by substantial declines in big producing states
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such as Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and California (Am. Gas Assoc,
et al.
, 1973, p. 22-23). The estimated 90-day productive capacity for crude
oil and natural gas liquids attainable on March 31, 1970, was lU ,788 ,000 bar-
rels per day; three years later, the productive capacity attainable on March
31, 1973, had declined by 11 percent to 13,168,000 barrels per day (Am. Gas
Assoc, et al., 1970, p. 1; 1973, p. l).
The supply/demand situation in the United States has continued to de-
teriorate. During the first six months of 1973, domestic crude oil production
was 2.5 percent lower than in the same period in 1972. In the face of a declin-
ing supply, demand for all oil products increased by 6.0 percent. To overcome
this deficit, crude oil imports were increased by ^5.9 percent and imports of
refined products by l6.5 percent.
The demand for residual fuel oils increased by 11.2 percent during
this period. Even though production of residual increased 21.7 percent and im-
ports rose by 6.2 percent, stocks were 7.7 percent lower in June 1973 than at
the same time a year earlier. The propane situation also has deteriorated. Pro-
duction increased by only 1.0 percent in the face of a 6.5 percent increase in
demand for propane. To overcome this deficit, imports soared by 73.6 percent and
stocks were drawn down by 17.9 percent. In anticipation of winter fuel needs,
imports of distillate fuel oils during the first six months of 1973 increased by
113.3 percent over imports in the same period in 1972 (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973e).
Why the Energy Crisis?
Although the effects of the current energy crisis have made them-
selves widely felt only recently, various experts had predicted as much as 15
or more years ago that shortages in natural gas and petroleum were likely to
occur in the 1970s. Unfortunately, their predictions were not heeded when
they were made, and no corrective measures were taken. The precise timing of
the current shortages was accelerated by rates of growth in energy demand that
were greater than projected, by the imposition of environmental regulations
that caused a widespread switchover to clean fuels that already were in short
supply, and by the recent Arab oil embargo that has curtailed our total oil
supply by from 11 to 18 percent. However, examination of the long-term trends
in reserves and the finding rates for new reserves indicate that our fuels
position has been declining for a number of years.
The adequacy of reserves of a particular mineral commodity may be
judged by several useful indicators or ratios. One of these is the F/P ratio,
or the finding-to-production ratio, the ratio of the quantity of new additions
to remaining reserves found in any given year compared with the quantity of
production during the same year. As long as the F/P ratio is 1 to 1 or higher,
new reserves are being found at a rate sufficient to replace those depleted by
current production. If the ratio falls below 1 to 1, sufficient reserves are
not being maintained to accommodate the current production rate.
Figure 13 indicates the trend in the F/P ratio for crude oil in the
United States from I9U6 to 1972. The ratio has been trending downward for most
of the period; in fact, it dropped below 1 to 1 as early as 1957 and again in
I960, 1962, and 1963. Since 1966 the F/P ratio has been consistently below the
replacement level. The figure also shows similar data for natural gas. Again
the downward trend is evident, or even more pronounced. Although the F/P ratio
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for natural gas never fell "below 1 to 1 prior to 1968, it came very close to
it in 195^ and i960. The addition of the Alaskan North Slope reserves in 1970
reversed the trend for one year, but the ratio fell again in 1971 and 1972.
The R/P ratio also indicates the adequacy of reserves. It compares
total reserves in any given year to the production in that year. As long as
production is below the maximum producible level, this ratio may or may not
be important. It has been argued that the reserves figure is not a signifi-
cant indicator of maximum productive capacity because only enough reserves are
proved up in advance of production to allow for proper planning in production,
and that the cost of proving up additional reserves is uneconomic. If this
argument is correct, it may well explain the rather level and narrow range in
which the R/P ratio for oil lay from I9U6 through 1965 (fig. 1*0. A signifi-
cant decline in the ratio began in 1966 and, except for the rise in 1970 caused
by the addition of the Alaskan North Slope reserves, the decline has continued.
Even more important, however, is the fact the R/P ratio is approaching the
level of maximum sustainable output, which is about 8 to 1.
The R/P ratio for natural gas has been falling steadily for almost
the entire 26 years between 19*+6 and 1972. In the period from 19*+6 tnrough
1962 when the R/P ratio was above 20 to 1, there was little reason to be con-
cerned about a gas shortage because a 20-year supply was sufficient to jus-
tify a pipeline and to allocate supplies for long-term contracts. However,
when the R/P ratio began to drop below the 20 to 1 level there was room for
concern, but as late as 1966 the then chairman of the Federal Power Commission
was quoted as stating that there were ample reserves of natural gas and that a
declining R/P ratio was "not a cause for alarm" (Oil and Gas Jour., 1966).
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Pig. 13 - Trend in the finding-to-production ratio (P/P) for oil and natural gas, 1946- 1972.
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.
Unfortunately, he and the other optimists have "been proved wrong—
a
gas shortage is already upon us. Last winter many industrial customers, es-
pecially in the Midwest, who were on interruptible contracts had their gas sup-
plies curtailed during periods of peak demand (industry Week, 1973a). As a
result, plants closed in several states and workers were laid off. Fortunately,
most of these closings were of short duration, hut the impact was severe for
those involved. Some of the utilities in the Midwest have announced that gas
curtailments to industrial customers will take place during the winter of
1973-197*+ and that no new large customers will he added to their systems in
the immediate future (Wall Street Jour., 1973a, 1973e). The Federal Power Com-
mission has estimated that total gas curtailments from April through October
1973 amounted to 966.3 billion cubic feet, an increase of 7U percent over 1972.
For the winter of 1973-197^, I** interstate pipeline companies have indicated
that together they expect to curtail gas deliveries by 679-7 billion cubic feet,
20 percent more than last year (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973g)
.
SHORT-RUN OPTIONS
In light of the evidence that most fuels will likely be in short
supply for at least the next few years, industry in the Midwest is faced with
the problem of finding stop-gap measures
.
The American Gas Association has projected natural gas sales by
census regions through the year 1990. It has predicted that between 1971
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and 1976 gas sales to industry in the East North Central Region (Ohio, Indi-
ana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) will decline 10.8 percent; in the
West North Central Region ( including Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri) gas sales
to industry will decline 20.2 percent. For the East South Central Region
(including Kentucky), industrial gas sales are predicted to remain essentially
unchanged (-0.H percent) during the 1971-1976 period. The report (Am. Gas
Assoc, 1973, p. S-12, S-13) predicts:
The 1976 industrial gas sales in this [East North Central] region will not
only be 29 percent less than their potential, but will also show an actual
decline in volume due to supply deficiencies. Normal growth patterns will re-
emerge, however, in the next decade.
Total gas sales [in the West North Central Region] from 1971 to 1976 are
expected to show a volumetric decrease of about one percent, although this is
concentrated in the industrial sector. [Reduced] gas sales for electric power
generation (a component of industrial sales) are primarily responsible for
this decline.
If natural gas will not be available in sufficient quantities to
meet new industrial demands and probably will not be available for even all
old customers, what are the possibilities of using coal? The answer to this
question is partly controlled by the policies of the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency. Unless proved flue-gas desulfurization techniques
or systems can be widely installed in existing plants, industrial consumers
in the Midwest who wish to continue to burn coal must either obtain a vari-
ance to burn high-sulfur coal or switch to coals that are either naturally
low enough in sulfur to comply with the standards or can be cleaned by con-
ventional preparation methods to meet such standards.
Recently, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency proposed an
allowable change in state implementation plans that accepts the selective
use of "supplementary control procedures" for certain fossil-fuel burning
stationary sources. These procedures would involve continuous monitoring of
stack gas emissions, meteorological conditions, and ambient air quality in
the vicinity of the source. By using these data in computer diffusion models
for predicting concentrations of pollutants, emissions can be cut back during
periods when air quality is poor by a reduction in the rate of plant opera-
tions. The EPA's acceptance of supplementary control procedures was based
on a recognition that adequate technology for control of sulfur oxides is not
available now at many locations. However, the EPA's action is only a delay
in the implementation of secondary standards in some areas , not an abandonment
of these standards. Plants using these strategies are required to be working
towards a permanent solution to their emissions problems. The use of tall
stacks as an air pollution control strategy was rejected (Engineering and
Mining Jour., 1973, p. 13).
The problems involved in using western coals have already been dis-
cussed. In light of these problems and of the delays involved in developing
and implementing new coal supply systems, it is unlikely that any customer
who has not already committed himself to using western coals will be able to
convert his plant to burn such coal or to secure needed supplies in less than
two or three years. Therefore, for many industrial consumers in the Midwest
Region, switching to low-sulfur coal from the west is not a viable short-term
solution to their fuel supply problems.
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Because it is unlikely that natural gas will be available in suf-
ficient quantities to meet all demands, because midwestern coals are gener-
ally unacceptable on environmental grounds, and because the short-term avail-
ability of vast quantities of low-sulfur western coals is highly questionable,
it had been assumed that refined petroleum products could be counted on to
fill the increasing deficits. However, as was pointed out earlier, domestic
production of crude oil has declined. Not only is production inadequate to
meet current demands, but it will not be able to meet the additional demands
being made because of shortages in other fuels. Therefore, any increased use
of petroleum products must involve increased oil imports. Even prior to the
recent Arab oil embargo, the shortage of oil was growing because a number of
problems were peaking at the same time (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973a, p. 27):
...booming demand, declining domestic production, a worldwide shortage of
sweet (low-sulfur) crude oil, and tight supplies even of sour (high-sulfur)
crude, too little U.S. refining capability, and inadequate facilities to
distribute surging imports of crude and products throughout the country.
Because imported refined products are more expensive than imports
of crude oil, it would have been preferable to import crude oil and then re-
fine it here in the United States. Domestic output, however, has been limited
by a shortage of refining capacity, and, consequently, imports of refined
products have increased substantially in recent years. During the first six
months of 1973, imports accounted for 66.0 percent of our residual fuel oil
supply, 17-7 percent of jet fuel, 11.9 percent of distillate fuel oil, 8.6
percent of propane
,
and 1
.
k percent of gasoline (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1973e).
The lack of adequate refinery capacity is partly the result of
economic conditions that have prevailed in this country for the last 6 to 8
years, during which low prices for petroleum products have made the rate of
return on such investments unsatisfactory (Shell Oil Co., 1973, p. 10-11).
Opposition to proposed new refineries for environmental reasons also has
caused delay or cancellation of several projects (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973f,
p. vr).
Between January 1, 196l , and January 1, 1973, the operating capac-
ity for all refineries in the United States increased by 39.7 percent, from
9.63 million barrels per day to 13.^5 million barrels per day. However, since
the demand for oil products was increasing even faster, the gap between de-
mand and domestic refinery capacity increased from 168,000 barrels per day at
the end of i960 to 2,900,000 barrels per day at the end of 1972. In other
words, the self-sufficiency of the United States declined from 98.3 percent
to 82.3 percent over the 12-year period. Even if the United States wished to
restrict its imports to crude oil only and refine the products here, it would
lack sufficient capacity to do so (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1963
,
p. 3; 1973a, p. 3;
Am. Petroleum Inst., 1973, p. h )
.
Because of insufficient refining capacity in the United States,
many domestic companies and consumers had been counting on increased imports
of refined products to meet their future needs. A likely source of such im-
ports is Western Europe, where there was thought to be a surplus of refining
capacity. However, even prior to the curtailment of Arab oil shipments to
Europe, some observers felt that the ability of these refineries to supply
the United States with the needed volumes of products was overrated (Oil and
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Gas Jour., 1973b). In light of the cutback on Arab oil shipments to Europe,
this source may dry up completely. It has been estimated that as much as
300,000 barrels per day of product imports to the United States originate in
Western Europe (industry Week, 1973c). What products are available on the
world market are in very tight supply, with severe competition driving prices
up rapidly. In any case, increased imports of products was considered only
a short-term solution. Over the longer run, it is felt that it is essential
that the United States increase its domestic refinery capacity.
Since the announcement last spring of a revised oil import program,
United States refiners have made firm commitments of more than $1 billion to
expand existing plants by 1.13 million barrels per day (West, 1973, p. 32).
In addition, six other companies have made firm commitments to build new re-
fineries (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973f, p. h6) . It has been estimated that all
of the proposed projects combined will cost between $2 and $3 billion and
could eventually increase U.S. refinery capacity by approximately 2.5 mil-
lion barrels per day (industry Week, 1973b, p. 25). However, although these
announcements are a good sign, problems still must be overcome. Many of the
planned refineries may not be built because of opposition on environmental
grounds from state and local authorities. The Department of the Interior pre-
dicts no significant relief in the tight supply situation will occur until
1975, when the first big refinery expansions are completed (Oil and Gas Jour.,
1973f, p. ^+6). Even if all the planned projects are completed—and this will
take years—these additions will not be sufficient to eliminate completely
the refining capacity deficit. It is estimated that by 1980 the United States'
will need the equivalent of 58 new refineries, each with an average through-
put capacity of 160,000 barrels per day; they will cost as much as $30 billion
(Industry Week, 1973b, p. 26).
To make matters worse, the sudden curtailment of Arab oil has caused
many companies that had previously announced plans for new or expanded refin-
ery facilities to re-evaluate those plans, because many of the proposed plants
were expected to run on imported Arab oil. Fearing a lack of assured crude
oil, some of the proposed refineries will be delayed or even canceled. Both
actions will aggravate and prolong the fuels shortages (Wall Street Jour.
,
1973f).
A last point to be considered with regard to oil availability is the
question of sulfur content . Many of the oils being imported from foreign sources
are sour (high-sulfur) crude oils that must be desulfurized before they can
meet current and proposed sulfur standards that generally limit the sulfur con-
tent to 1.0 percent or less. Some metropolitan areas have even more restric-
tive standards of 0.3 percent or less sulfur (Environmental Science & Tech-
nology, 1973, p. U95).
Although the technology for desulfurizing oil is available, it has
been used on only a limited scale because the process adds considerably to
the cost of the final products. In the past few years, domestic refineries
have increased their output of low-sulfur fuel oils and, at present, many re-
fineries in the United States have some capacity for removing sulfur from the
more costly light and distillate oils, although they have little capacity for
the production of low-sulfur residual fuel oil from sour crudes. Sufficient
amounts of low-sulfur residual will not be available in time for all customers
to be able to comply with the 1975 deadline set by the EPA, because it takes
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2 years or longer to complete a refinery (Environmental Science and Technology,
1973). Only plants that either have been announced or are under construction
will be able to porduce a low-sulfur residual fuel oil by 1976.
During the first 6 months of 1973, only 50.8 percent of the residual
fuel oil produced could meet a 1.0 percent sulfur standard. The supply situ-
ation for the oils even lower in sulfur content (0.5 percent or less) was even
worse. Only 27.5 percent of the residual and 63.9 percent of the No. h fuel
oil produced between January and June 1973 could meet the lower standard (U.S.
Bur. Mines, 1973d, p. k)
.
Because more of the distillate fuel oils can meet the low-sulfur
standards
, some customers have tried to switch to distillate or else to buy
low-sulfur distillate oil for blending with high-sulfur residual. Unfortunately,
such a move has only compounded the supply problems by taking fuel oil away
from the residential and commercial heating markets at the very time when sup-
plies of these fuels are already short (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973e). Because of
the threat of further switching, the Federal Government has proposed regula-
tions that would place a ban on further conversion from higher sulfur coals
and residual oils to lower sulfur distillate fuel oils (Wall Street Jour.,
1973f).
NEW ENERGY SOURCES
The main focus of this paper has been on conventional fossil fuels
that are currently available. However, over the longer run the United States
must increasingly turn to other sources of energy to meet its growing demands.
Although much has been written about the potential for such new sources as
solar energy, geothermal power, nuclear fusion, MHD (magnetohydrodynamics)
,
and oil shales, most of those sources are still many years away from widespread
commercial use, and many will have little direct impact on the energy supply
of the Midwest Region. The potential magnitude of the supply of energy from
various new sources and the types of problems that must be resolved before
such potential can be achieved have been discussed at some length in a recent
Survey publication by Risser (1973). No attempt is made in this report to
cover the broader aspects of the long-range energy supply problem, but five of
the new sources with special significance for the Midwest Region will be dis-
cussed briefly.
Tar Sands
Since the late 1960s, a prototype plant has been producing oil from
the tar sands of the Athabasca region of Alberta, Canada, and small quantities
of these "Athabasca hydrocarbons" have been exported into the Midwest (PAD II)
since March of 1968 (U.S. Bur. Mines, 1968
,
p. 16). Although additional plants
are planned that would increase the output of Canadian tar sand oil to from
275,000 to 500,000 barrels per day by 1980 (Nat. Petroleum Council, 1971, p.
180), the impact of such oil on the total energy supply of the United States
is difficult to predict at this time. If all of these plants are built, their
output in 1980 would be equivalent to 1.3 to 2.U percent of the predicted con-
sumption of 20.8 million barrels of oil per day in the United States at that
time (Dupree and West, 1972, p. 31).
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Although the Midwest Region would likely be a major consumer of such
oil, several problems are involved. First, the growing oil shortages in Can-
ada make it problematical how much of the tar sand oil will be available for
export and whether the government will allow it to be exported. Second, the
decision as to whether to go ahead with the next tar sand plant (the Syncrude
project) has been delayed pending resolution of differences between the Al-
berta government and the oil companies regarding tax and royalty provisions
(Wall Street Jour., 19T3e, p. U).
Although the United States possesses large reserves of tar sands in
Utah and other states, it has previously been considered uneconomic to utilize
them. However, in light of the recent substantial increases in the price of
crude oil and the shortages of oil from other sources, interest in our domes-
tic tar sand resources may increase. Although the technology for extracting
oil from the Canadian tar sands is considered as perfected, it may not be
directly transferable to our domestic deposits (Nat. Petroleum Council, 1972,
p. 226).
Liquefied Natural Gas
A promising new source of natural gas is liquefied natural gas, or
LNG. In several areas of the world, surplus gas is available because the
local market is too limited to consume all of the potentially producible gas
from local fields (Federal Power Comm. , 1972, p. 59-83). Some of this gas is
"flared" (burned off) so that the associated oil can be produced, but more of-
ten it is put back into the ground for future use.
As many of the areas where surplus gas is located are too remote
from potential markets and/or are located in areas where large expanses of
ocean separate them from the markets, normal pipeline transport of this gas
is not feasible. However, if natural gas is cooled to -259° F at atmospheric
pressure, it will become liquid. In liquid form it can be moved by special
tankers insulated to keep the gas liquid. In the process of liquefaction,
the volume of the gas is reduced to l/600th of its volume as a gas at room
temperature
.
Although a sizable number of LNG projects are either under develop-
ment or on the drawing boards, only a few are in actual operation at this
time. Ironically, one of the first of the projects to be placed in operation
involves LNG exports from Alaska to Japan (Gardner, 1972). This project was
conceived in the mid-1960s before the current energy crisis. At that time,
selling to Japan appeared to be the only way Alaskan producers in the Kenai
Peninsula could market their product because no pipeline to the United States
was available and Alaskan domestic distribution companies had shown no inter-
est in this more expensive source of gas. During 1972, U7.9 billion cubic
feet of LNG was shipped from Port Nikiski , Alaska, to Yokohama, Japan, at an
average price of 55-75 cents per thousand cubic feet. LNG imports into the
United States during that year amounted to 2.3 billion cubic feet, of which
2.03 billion cubic feet came in by tanker from Algeria at a cost of $1.25
per thousand cubic feet. The rest of the imported gas—230 million cubic feet-
was trucked in from Canada at a cost of $2.U8 per thousand cubic feet (inter-
natl. Gas Technology Highlights, 1973c).
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Generally speaking, most of the early projects have "been directed at
serving coastal rather than inland markets. However, with the increasing se-
verity of the domestic gas shortage, at least one midwestern gas company is
actively involved in an LNG import project designed to "bring such gas into the
upper Midwest markets. Peoples Gas Company of Chicago has contracted with Stan-
dard Oil Company of Indiana to bring natural gas from Trinidad "by LNG tanker to
Louisiana, where it will "be regasified and injected into the company's pipeline
distribution system. If all goes according to schedule, the first of this gas
will enter the Chicago market in 1976 at the rate of 200 million cubic feet per
day. Total investment in the project will be $1.5 to $2.0 billion (Wall Street
Jour., 1972a).
According to the Federal Power Commission, LNG imports are expected
to reach 0.3 trillion cubic feet per year in 1975 » or about 1.1 percent of the
estimated domestic consumption of gas in that year. By 1980
,
LNG imports are
expected to increase to 2.0 trillion cubic feet, but this will be equivalent to
only 8 percent of the total consumption in 1980 (Federal Power Coram. , 1972,
p. 3).
Synthetic Natural Gas
Another new energy source with intermediate- to long-range importance
is synthetic natural gas (SNG) , which is made from crude oil, naphtha, and other
petroleum-based feedstocks, most of them imported. Whether foreign naphtha will
be available in sufficient quantities (750,000 barrels per day by 1980) is ques-
tionable. Only one SNG plant was actually in operation by mid-1973, but 35
other plants are either under construction or in the planning or engineering
stage. If all of the plants on the drawing boards are completed, their combined
capacity will be 5.5 billion cubic feet per day (Wett, 1973). This would be
equivalent to more than 2.0 trillion cubic feet per year, or to about 9 percent
of the natural gas consumption in the United States in 1972.
The Midwest Region will benefit directly from this program, for eight
of the proposed plants are to be located there. Five of them are planned for
Illinois and one each for Missouri, Michigan, and Ohio. The combined initial
planned capacity of these plants is 1,216 million cubic feet per day (Wett
,
1973), which would be equivalent to about 8 percent of the region's 1972 total
gas consumption. The first of these plants, at Marysville, Michigan, came on
stream in October, 1973 (Oil and Gas Jour., 1973h) , and most of the other plants
should be operating by 1976. Preliminary estimates for the cost of SNG from
these plants are between $1.00 and $1.50 per thousand cubic feet. However, re-
cent increases in the price of feedstocks, such as propane and naphtha, plus in-
flation of construction costs have caused prices to escalate sharply. For ex-
ample, Algonquin SNG, Inc., is building a plant at Freetown, Massachusetts. In
1971, delivered prices were projected at $1.80 per million Btu, but in 1973 they
filed a revised schedule with the Federal Power Commission indicating that the
projected prices for SNG from their Freetown plant were now $2.78 per million
Btu. The reasons for the price escalation were that the price of propane had
tripled (from 10 to 30 cents per gallon) and the price of naphtha had increased
52 percent (from 10.5 to 16.0 cents per gallon). Investment costs for the
plant had increased from $39.5 million to $60.0 million during the two-year
period (internatl. Gas Technology Highlights , 1973e).
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In light of such cost escalations and the forecast shortages in raw
material feedstocks, some of the contemplated SNG plants may not be built. In
fact, the completion of two proposed SNG plants in New Jersey and Oregon has
been delayed because the required feedstocks for the plants have not been se-
cured (Internatl. Gas Technology Highlights, 1973a; 1973b).
Synthetic natural gas derived from petroleum-based feedstocks should
be considered only as a stop-gap, short-term source of energy, for coal gasi-
fication and liquefaction will be superior methods of obtaining energy, both
from the viewpoint of cost and the wise use of resources.
Coal Gasification and Liquefaction
Coal gasification and liquefaction offer tremendous potential in the
future because the coal resource base of the United States completely dwarfs
our resources of oil and natural gas. The Midwest is favorably situated for
the development of such an industry, as has been previously discussed by Risser
(1968). The Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, in conjunction with Peabody
Coal Company, had planned to build a coal gasification plant in Illinois, but
recently announced that the project would be temporarily shelved and a plant
in eastern Wyoming substituted (internatl. Gas Technology Highlights, 19v 3d)
.
This represented a temporary setback for the Midwest , but ultimately such
plants will be built here to take advantage of the region's vast coal reserves
and close proximity to major markets. The first commercial coal-to-gas plants,
which are planned for completion in the mid-1970s in New Mexico, will use the
Lurgi process.
Despite much effort for many decades, commercial coal gasification
on a large scale is still considered by many to be several years away. Di-
rector H. Guyford Stever of the National Science Foundation, in recent testi-
mony before the House of Representatives Science & Astronautics Energy Sub-
committee, noted that, while 12 coal gasification plants could be in operation
by 1985 > "...it is important to realize that it will be in the 1990s before
coal gasification can substantially supplement our natural gas supply." (Coal
Age, 1973.)
The technology to produce synthetic liquid fuels from coal is even
less advanced than the gasification technology (Natl. Petroleum Council, 1971,
p. 126). As a result, it appears that coal liquefaction will not help to meet
our energy needs until sometime after 1985.
Solvent -Refined Coal
Because of the expense and problems involved in using western coals
and the unavailability of flue-gas desulfurization technology, much interest
has arisen in finding a way to clean up high-sulfur coals. Conventional wash-
ing, froth flotation, and gravity separation methods are incapable of cleaning
most high-sulfur coals sufficiently to meet some current standards. Therefore,
research is being carried out to develop a chemical method of "refining" the
coal to remove the bulk of the sulfur and non-combustible material occurring
in the raw coal.
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An l8-million-dollar pilot plant with a capacity of producing 50
tons of solvent-refined coal (SRC) per day is now under construction at Fort
Lewis, Washington. The project is "being financed by the Office of Coal Re-
search (OCR), U.S. Department of the Interior. The Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Mining Company (P & M) , a subsidiary of Gulf Oil Co., developed the process
being used at the plant and will operate the unit for OCR. The process is
reported capable of converting coals (except anthracites) of any sulfur con-
tent into a solid fuel with a heat value of 16 ,000 Btu per pound (nearly one-
third higher than the heat value of a typical bituminous coal)
,
a sulfur con-
tent of less than 1.0 percent, and 0.1 percent ash. The cost of solvent-re-
fined coal, based on small-scale tests, has been estimated as being equal to
the cost of the raw coal (in cents per million Btu) plus 35 cents per million
Btu for processing (Oil and Gas Jour., 1972).
The long-range contribution of solvent-refined coal is hard to pre-
dict. Although the process has much potential, its ultimate success will de-
pend on perfecting the method and on its cost relative to synthetic liquid
and gaseous fuels produced from coal by other processes. SRC is not likely
to have much of an impact until the 1980s at the earliest.
ENERGY CONSERVATION
The question has been raised as to what extent conservation and more
efficient use of energy might allow the United States to reduce a significant
part of its future demand for energy. The Office of Emergency Preparedness
(1972, p. ii) issued a report in October 1972 in which the possibility of sig-
nificantly reducing energy demand in the United States by 1980 was indicated.
Measures needed to achieve adequate conservation include: (l) improvement of
insulation in homes; (2) adoption of more efficient air conditioning systems;
(3) shifting of intercity freight from truck to rail, intercity passenger
traffic from airplanes to surface means , and urban passenger traffic from pri-
vate automobile to mass transit; (U) consolidating shipments of urban freight;
and (5) introduction of more efficient industrial processes and equipment.
The estimated savings in energy consumption shown in the report were
based on the assumption that the conservation measures suggested can actually
be implemented. No in-depth analysis of the feasibility of implementation,
of consumer acceptance, or of impact on the economy was undertaken. However,
total annual energy savings as the result of the implementation of such meas-
ures would be only k.3 quadrillion Btu by 1975 (Office of Emergency Prepared-
ness, 1972, p. vii-ix) , which represents a reduction of 5.^- percent of the
projected energy consumption (80.27 quadrillion Btu) for 1975 (Dupree and West,
1972, p. 17). The estimated annual savings on energy by 1980 would be equiv-
alent to 7.3 million barrels per day. This amounts to 2.66 billion barrels or
1^.97 quadrillion Btu per year. Energy conservation measures, if they can be
implemented, could reduce estimated energy consumption in I98O (96.02 quad-
rillion Btu) by 15.6 percent. Despite this reduction, the energy demand for
1980 would still be 12. h percent higher than it was in 1972. Proposed energy
conservation measures will help slow down the rate of growth in energy use,
but they will not solve the problems of energy shortages.
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CONCLUSIONS
1) The energy crisis that currently faces the United States is not a
short-term phenomenon. It is likely that it will be with us for at least the
next decade.
2) Although the recent emergence of environmental activism and legis-
lation has compounded the current energy crisis, it is not the cause of the
shortages.
3) The current shortages of oil and natural gas do not result from ex-
haustion of reserves and potential resources in the United States, hut rather
from the fact that we have used up the readily available reserves to the limit
of their maximum efficient productivity.
h) The Federal Power Commission's regulation of wellhead prices for
natural gas has distorted the normal market operations so that we have, in
effect, encouraged the consumption of gas—the fuel in shortest supply—for
uses for which other, more abundant fuels could suffice. The other effect of
the hold-down on prices has been to discourage the drilling for new gas re-
serves, which, in turn, has contributed to the decline in available natural
gas.
5) In the past, the industrial market in the Midwest Region has depended
on coal and natural gas to supply 85 to 90 percent of its fossil fuel needs.
Until the recent gas shortages, the trend was from coal to gas. Although the
region is essentially self-sufficient in coal, it must import more than 90 per-
cent of its oil and natural gas requirements.
6) Although the Midwest Region is abundantly endowed with coal resources,
practically all of them have a sulfur content too high for compliance with cur-
rent or proposed air-quality standards for sulfur oxides emissions. Approxi-
mately 76 percent of the reserves contain 3.0 percent or more sulfur, and only
3.8 percent of the region's coals contain 0.7 percent or less sulfur.
7) Continued use of coal by industry (and other consumers) in the Mid-
west Region after the mid-1975 EPA deadline will be possible only if one or
more of the following schemes can be implemented:
a) Perfection of technically feasible and economically
competitive flue-gas desulfurization devices and
their installation on boiler units.
b) Conversion of boilers to enable them to burn western low-
sulfur coals, provided supplies of such coals can be pro-
cured.
c) Blending of low-sulfur coals with high-sulfur coals in such
a ratio that the standard of 1.2 pounds of sulfur oxides
per million Btu of heat input can be met.
d) Conversion to a dual-fuel system in which low-sulfur oil
or natural gas is burned jointly with high-sulfur coals
in such a ratio that the 1.2 pound limit is met.
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e) Use of supplementary control systems that involve
close monitoring of the ambient air and reduction in
operating loads during periods of atmospheric inver-
sions to maintain primary standards.
8) Over the longer run, continued use of coal is likely to depend upon
the eventual perfection of the solvent refining process for cleaning up coals
and/or on the conversion of coal into synthetic gas and oil. However, the
widespread use of such processes will not occur until the 1980s or later.
9) Because natural gas is not likely to "be available in sufficient
amounts to meet all of the expected demands for it, allocation of available
supplies will result in curtailments to certain users, particularly the in-
dustrial and utility consumers on interruptible contracts , although some con-
sumers on firm contracts also will be cut off for varying lengths of time.
10
)
For many industrial consumers of coal in the Midwest Region, the
only real options open in the immediate future are to switch to (or increase
use of) refined petroleum products or to obtain a variance to continue burn-
ing high-sulfur coals. However, distillate fuel oils are expected to be in
very short supply this winter, and how quickly domestic coal supplies can
be increased to meet new demands is problematical. It is therefore likely
that there will be plant closings this winter during periods of peak demand.
11 Although conservation of energy through utilization of more efficient
processes, improved insulation, and other measures can help to stretch the avail-
able supplies, it cannot solve our energy crisis in the immediate future.
12) Mandatory fuel allocation programs instituted by the Federal Govern-
ment on November 1, 1973, may be able to increase the effective supply by
shifting surpluses in one area to regions where deficits exist. However, such
programs cannot increase the actual amount of fuel available for use.
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